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ABSTRACT
A while ago, I developed what I called an encryption method.  
The  most  favorable  of  reviews  did  not  see  a  method  but  a 
collection of techniques.  (The use of base Fibonacci being the 
most interesting.)  Be that as it may, whatever process is being 
used,  is  described  in  the  original  paper,  “Windtalking 
Computers”  [ZIR01].   This paper is about  the steganographic 
method  described  in  ZIR01,  the  cryptanalysis  efforts  of  that 
method  and;  a  real  world  application  of  that  method  as  an 
answer to the increasing problem of password file hacking.  The 
premise is that the technique is a variant of one time pad, using a 
novel  way to  produce  one  time  pad  output  for  digital  input.  
There is no record in the literature of such a method being used 
for encryption at all.  This includes being used for one time pad 
encryption.  Digital encryption generally treats the letters of the 
plaintext  as  a  binary  number  and  does  some  mathematical 
computation to produce ciphertext.   The idea of  inserting bits 
with  a  random generated  key is  new.   Therefore  (because  a 
uniquely  random  generated  key  is  used),  the  encryption  is 
cryptanalytically  unbreakable  and/or  computationally  secure 
and/or information theoretic.  An academic version was made. 
Challenges  for  decryption  have  not  produced  to-date  a 
decryption.   Advantages and disadvantages of the method are 
discussed.  
Hackers  are  constantly  penetrating  networks  and  stealing 
password files.  Which, once in possession of a password file,  
hackers individually or collectively with distributed processing 
over  the  Internet,  decrypt  the  values  of  the  hash  passwords. 
Thereby gaining access to systems.  This problem has become 
sufficiently  significant  for  CAESAR  (Competition  for 
Authenticated  Encryption:  Security,  Applicability,  and 
Robustness) [CAE01]  to make calls for papers for solutions.  
Herein is one proposed solution.  While one time pad presents a 
problem being computationally intensive, for the relatively short 
length  of  passwords,  the  cost  of  computation  may  be  cost 
effective for the security provided.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing frequency of password files being captured 
and  hacked  over  the  Internet,  CAESER has  made  a  call  for 
papers  for  suggested  solutions  to  the  problem.   This  paper 
proposes  a solution  to  the  problem.   The solution  involves  a 
unique  and  novel  variant  of  one  time  pad  applied  with  a 
variation of a common session key issuing protocol.  As the size 
of passwords are small, the cost of computation of unique non-
repeating keys is reasonable.
2. T.E.C. ALGORITHM DEFINITION
T.E.C.  is  described  as  2  separate  methods  /  categories  of 
encryptions or methodologies of encryption.   One method is a 
form of steganography which uses bit shifting and the insertion 
of bits to mask the original byte stream.  The supposition is, that 
the T.E.C. steganographic codec is analogous to one time pad.
Although not necessary for the T.E.C. steganographic method to 
be effective, a premise of some of the T.E.C. methods posits that 
using  certain  techniques  in  combination  causes  certain 
combinatorics  that  are  relevant  to  either  making  brute  force 
computationally  unfeasible  or  cryptoanalytically  unbreakable. 
As I  will  explain,  these  techniques  are  not  necessary for  the 
security of the stenagraphy.  It is an added benefit to use one of 
the  methods  described  of  using  an  alternate  binary 
representation  other  than  base  2  [WIK01][WIK03],  but  not 
necessary for the T.E.C. steganographic method to be “prefectly 
secure”.  In and of itself, using an alternate binary base is merely 
obscurity  security.   Using  an  alternate  binary  representation 
other  than  base  2,  increases  the  many  possible  binary 
representations necessarily considered for decryption and; will 
increase the number of bytes used to represent a character.  [See 
[HUF01][SHA01]  [ZIR01].   Base  2  is  the  most  compact 
compressed binary representation.]  
As  ZIR01  posits,  almost  all  encryption  targets  the  letters 
themselves or their numeric value.  T.E.C. on the other hand, 
targets  the  binary representation  and  does  so  separately from 
attempting  to  encrypt  the  written  language.   There  is  no 
encryption of the letters per se.  The encryption is solely of the 
binary representation.
3. CRYPTANALYSIS
3.1 Fundamentals
Kerckhoff's principle [KER01] and T.E.C.
Conventional crytologic wisdom has it that whatever we know, 
our attackers know.  The attackers  know the algorithm.  The 
attackers can get their hands on the ciphertext.  But, they don't  
have the key. [KAH01] [KER01]
To make T.E.C.  analogous  to  this  cryptologic  theory that  the 
attackers know what we know:  
 An article describing the encryption processes is 
published.  
 The T.E.C. steganographic technique interjects 
additional bits into the byte stream to alter the byte stream.
 A random key is generated from a transcendental 
number that is used to choose how many bits to insert into each 
byte.
 An academic version is available.  We can download 
the academic version and use it to generate specific ciphertext, 
given specific plaintext.  Then, we can try to cryptanalyze the 
ciphertext.
 Other techniques may be used in combination with the 
bit insertion steganography.   Ex. Using an alternate binary 
representation, a mathematical computation on the plaintext, a 
conventional key encryption of the plaintext, etc.
3.2 Cryptanalysis of the T.E.C. 
Steganographic Method
Cryptanalysis  of  the  steganographic  method  as  presented  in 
ZIR001 is straightforward.  There is an obvious weakness in the 
example presented in ZIR001.  (So, I won't belabor explaining 
the weakness.)   However,  as an example of implementing bit 
shifting  as  an  encryption  method,  the  example  is  good.   As 
reviewers have noted,  if enough randomness is used with this 
technique,  then  it  becomes  the  equivalent  of  one  time  pad. 
Albeit implemented in a very different way from conventional 
keying.   The  selection  of  unique  random  keys  is  all  that  is 
required to fulfill this requirement.
The novelty of T.E.C. is the bit  shifting and bit  insertion for 
steganography and;  to use bit  shifting insertion as a one time 
pad.
Also, as described in ZIR01,the steganography could be used in 
combination with the an alternate binary representation.   This 
would complicate matters more.  But, any one of those methods 
or combination of methods is irrelevant.  The strength of T.E.C. 
steganography lies in the random non-repeating key.
Also,  as  the  name  transcendental  encryption  codec  implies, 
transcendental  numbers  are  used  for  random  sequencing. 
Reviewers have noted that using a transcendental like Pi is not  
really random.  Because, the sequence is well known.  This is 
true.  In response, as posited in ZIR01, the codec can use many 
unique  transcendental  numbers,  for  each  user,  or  even  each 
instance.  Since, “an infinite number of transcendentals exist”. 
The math to do this  does exist  (and could include the use of 
personal  identifiers  and  timedate  stamps  so  uniqueness  is 
guaranteed).   For  a  few  examples  of  the  number  theory 
supporting this statement:
Set 1:  
{ א  | 
   { T’ VT’ = f(T1-∞,x1-∞)  x ≠ T, x ≠ -T, x ≠ T-1 } }
[The subsets of א, where all the transcendental numbers are the 
function of any transcendental and any another number, if the 
other number is neither the transcendental itself, nor the additive 
nor  multiplicative  inverse  of  the  primary  transcendental 
number.]
or,
Set 2:  
{ א  | 
     { T’ VT’ = f(T1-∞,x)  x ≠ T, x ≠ -T, x ≠ T-1 } }
[The subsets of א, where all the transcendental numbers are the 
function of any transcendental and another number, if the other 
number  is  neither  the  transcendental  itself,  nor  additive  nor 
multiplicative inverse of the primary transcendental number.]
or,
Set 3:  
{ א  | 
      { T’ VT’ = f(T,x1-∞)  x ≠ T, x ≠ -T, x ≠ T-1 } }
[The subsets of א, where all the transcendental numbers are the 
function of a transcendental and some other number, if the other 
number is neither the transcendental itself, nor the additive nor 
multiplicative inverse of the primary transcendental number.]
[There  are  sufficient  personal  identifiers  to  use  an  'x',  that  a 
unique combination is guaranteed.  The addition of a time date 
stamp to any combination of personal identifiers would surely 
guarantee  a unique number.]
Let us proceed, arguendo, the codec can do this—generate an 
infinite number of unique random numbers so each encryption 
will be unique.
The promoted advantage of the steganographic codec is that it 
can  generate  an  unlimited  supply  of  unique  non-repeating 
sequences  “on  the  fly”.   The  weakness  to  this  is  that  these 
sequences are generated by some kind of mathematical formula. 
If we know the input parameters to the equation, we can also 
calculate the sequence.  So, in a certain sense, the mask or key is 
not random.  [SCH01]
However,  how the sequence was interjected is also unknown. 
So, even if the key is known, the position of the key (necessary 
for  decryption)  is  not  known.   This  would  make  for  a  large 
number of “tries” for a brute force decryption.  A minimum of 4 
tries / byte (2^2), and a maximum of 8 tries / byte (2^3), raised 
to the power of the number of characters in the message.  
For a 200 character message (an average message) [FRI01], this 
would require a minimum of (2^2)^200 = 2^400 possible tries 
(decryptions)  and;  a  maximum of  (2^3)^200=2^600  possible 
tries (decrytions).   Since brute fails when the number of tries  
reach 2^20 or 2^40 [SCH01], then T.E.C. is by the same logic 
computationally  secure,  for  message  of  200  characters 
minimum.
Using  the  minimum  parameters,  4  tries  per  byte,  2^2;  a 
password   of a required  length  of 10 or  20  characters would 
need  (2^2)*10 and (2^2)*20 to  break with  brute  force.   This 
renders  T.E.C.  steganographic  encrypted  passwords 
computationally secure.  
If maximum parameters, 8 tries per byte, 2^3 are necessary; then 
a  5  character  password  encrypted  with  T.E.C.  steganography 
would  be  sufficient  to  be  resistant  to  brute  force  and  be 
computationally secure. [Since (2^2)*10 = (2^3)*5.]
If an alternate binary representation is used, it  will  generate a 
longer ciphertext with more possible positions and increase the 
number of tries necessary for brute force decryption.  Using a 
combinations  of  techniques  is  a  basic  theme  of  T.E.C. 
Something that must be considered while decrypting.
A protocol  demanding  a  10  character  password  is  all  that  is 
necessary to secure a password file with T.E.C.
In  addition,  T.E.C.  steganographic  as  a  one  time  pad,  is 
information theoretic producing several false positives.
There is a counter measure that can be built  into the software 
that in addition to all other parameters, the user can enter, add, 
parameters to  the formula.   So,  in  addition  to  the values that  
must be entered into the formula, values that may be hacked or 
social engineered or guessed, the actual formula itself  becomes 
as unique as a key in other encryption systems.  (Of course, the 
parameters could also be social engineered.)  The entire formula 
may only be known to the user alone.  Of course, the weakness 
here is not in the system, but in spoofing (with a false data entry 
screen  for  example)  to  trap  the  formula  parameters  (the 
equivalent of the password in this system). [MIT01][MIT02]
It appears that the T.E.C. steganographic version has the same 
requirements as one time pad [SHA01]—a unique key equal to 
the length of the transmission.  Then, T.E.C. steganograhpic is 
perfect  security.   One  must  have  knowledge  of  the  key  to 
decrypt the encryption.
We can debate  if  transcendental  numbers  are  normal  (have a 
normal distribution of digits).  No one really knows.  [PRE01]
T.E.C. steganographic  is truly innovative.   It  is an encryption 
that is an implementation of one time pad using steganography.
The  implementation  may  will  be  math  intensive.  This  may 
require a lot of computing power.  A disadvantage.  However, 
considering the length of a password—only 5 or 10 characters, 
and that these calculations will be done on the server side, the 
cost  of  computation  vs.  the  security  gained,  may  be  cost 
effective.
T.E.C.  steganography  inherently  increases  the  length  of  the 
output.   This  is  counter  almost  all  encryption  schemes. 
However,  this  similarity  to  hashing  [SCH01]  would  produce 
encrypted passwords in a ciphertext that would be longer than 
what the length of the plaintext password is.  Obscurity security. 
But, better than storing passwords in the clear.  However, unlike 
hashing, where the encrypted password ciphertext is one length 
for  all  plaintext  passwords  (as  it  is  on  Unix systems),  T.E.C. 
produces variable length ciphertext.  Since some other hashing 
schemes do the same, this variable length does not seem to be a 
drawback.
3.3 Dictionary Attacks
The success  of  a  dictionary attack  is  more  a  function  of  the 
password  selection  protocol  than  the  encryption  of  the 
passwords.  
An example of a strong password selection protocol:
 Must use a capital and small letter.  
 Must be a combination of letter-number-special 
character.  
 Do not use names.
 Do not use common identifying numbers such as birth 
dates, home addresses, phone numbers or social security 
numbers.
Passwords  selected  with  the  above  conditions  have  difficulty 
being guessed by dictionary attack.  
Also, as T.E.C. uses the full 256 character set, not just the alpha-
numeric subset Ex. 65-90 for A-Z.  But even, control codes such 
as 0-13, the programming of attacks and analysis becomes more 
complicated.  This has to be accounted for.  This is obscurity 
security at most.  However, it does raise the bar for the level of 
expertise required to attempt attacks and do cryptanalysis.  
3.4 Capture of Passwords During 
Transmission
In  an  Internet  application,  if  the  user  enters  the  password  in 
plaintext and then sends the password in plaintext to the host,.  
The  host  then  matches  the  submitted  password  with  the 
password  on  file.   This  submission  format  has  a  security 
weakness  that  the  plaintext  password  could  be  captured  in 
transit.  A significant problem that the CAESER call for papers  
wishes to address.  However, the password is sent, encrypted or 
in  the  clear,  if  captured,  the  attacker  can  simply  submit  the 
captured password to gain access.
Because T.E.C. steganographic can generate an infinite number 
of unique keys, T.E.C., in combination with some standard key 
transmission protocol,  presents  a solution  to  this  problem.  A 
plugin can be used to generate or encrypt a message or key sent 
to the host.  This encryption could be based on a timedate stamp 
or the encryption of another random number.  
Then, there is the issue of the user having sufficient computing 
power  to  run  the  math  intensive  plugin.   Again,  as  the 
calculations are for a small number of characters / numbers, this 
should be possible with acceptable performance.
A “man in the middle” approach might be used.  The attacker 
could acquire the plugin; generate a spoofed plugin that accepts 
the password and parameters, then possibly does the math, if the 
attacker is able to reverse engineer the math used.   This does 
present the problem of how the attacker would get the user to 
download and use the spoofed version of the plugin.  There are 
several social engineering possibilities.  [MIT01][MIT02]  The 
use of certificates and signatures might be a counter measure to 
prevent the use of spoofed plugins.
Another security issue of capturing the password is keylogging. 
There  is  no  software  defense  against  hardware  keylogging. 
Software keylogging has potential defenses.  There are anti-virus 
vendors  for  this.   T.E.C.  steganographic  does  not  prevent 
keylogging.  (T.E.C. keyfiles protects against keylogging.  But, 
that is not the subject of this paper.  See the commercial version 
of T.E.C. for a discussion of keyfiles.)
3.5 Brute Force
Brute  force  fails  against  a  theoretically  cryptoanalytically 
unbreakable encryption method such as one time key encryption. 
This has been proven.  [KAH01] [SCH01]  The only question is, 
is T.E.C. steganography the equivalent of one time pad.  Since 
the  steganography  is  done  with  unique  bit  patterns 
representative  of  unique  numbers,  I  maintain  that  T.E.C 
steganography is the equivalent of one time pad.  Hence, T.E.C.  
steganography  is  cryptanalytically  unbreakable,  information 
theoretic and perfectly secure.
Storing  passwords,  adhering  to  an  appropriate  password 
protocol, along with T.E.C. steganography would provide a very 
strong encryption, much better than conventional hashing.  This 
would secure the passwords in a password file at a much higher 
standard than is currently available, with hashing or otherwise.
Since  every  user  will  have  unique  personal  identifiers,  the 
transcendental created will be unique for each user.  So, there is 
no  possibility  of  extracting  the  individual  passwords,  lining 
them up and looking for clues to a key.   Even assuming that  
would be possible for such short text.
3.6 In Sum
As  I  understand  the  problem,  the  major  issue  is  that  the 
password files are seized.  Then, subsequently, either singly or 
with a distributed Internet network, either brute force attacked or 
cryptanalyzed  for  password  extraction.   T.E.C.  presents  one 
possible solution.
As  for  the  capture  of  passwords  during  submission  over  the 
Internet, while this may be an issue, it is not the primary method 
of intrusion.
In  sum,  T.E.C.  presents  a  solution  to  the  major  problem of 
stolen password files being decrypted.  
4. SECURE PASSWORD SUBMISSION
4.1 Fundamentals
In transmission, the security of the password is more a function 
of protocol than the strength of encryption.  The combination of 
the T.E.C. steganographic method and a protocol could provide 
much more protection than is currently available.  The following 
protocol is one example.
The  user  opens  an  account.   Submits  a  password;  formula 
parameters and several identifiers.  These identifiers do not have 
to be confidential information (such as birth date or government 
issued i.d. number).  These identifiers can be answers to security 
questions the user generates.  The identifiers correlate to a seed 
for the formulas for generation of a transcendental key.
The host chooses identifiers for each user.  Any user or account 
information will do.  The identifiers will correlate to a number  
and be used in  the host's  formula to  generate a non-repeating 
sequence.  Unlike the user's identifiers that the host must store, 
this information can be entered dynamically by the sysadmin.
The host independently, chooses a secret formula to encrypt all  
passwords.  This formula is different from the individual users' 
formulas.  This will require a restriction that no user can choose 
T-host for f(T,x).
The  host  does  not  reveal  the  host  secret  formula  or  user 
identifiers used as seeds for non-repeating number generation.
When the user  wishes to  login,  the user requests  a  time date 
stamp  from  the  host.   The  host  selects  one  of  the  user's 
identifiers.  Encrypts the time date stamp with the user's formula 
and one of the user's  identifiers.  The host temporarily retains 
this  information  (the  time  date  stamp  and  user  requesting  to 
login in).  
The host sends the encrypted time date stamp along with a token 
(a number) correlating to the user's identifier.
The user decrypts  the time date stamp with the identifier  and  
user formula.
The user encrypts the password with the time date stamp and an 
identifier  as  the  seed  for  the  user's  formula.   Then,  the 
user  sends  the  encrypted  password,  with  a  token  for  the 
identifier, to the host.
The host uses the user's formula, with the time date stamp and 
user identifier (correlating to the token received) as the seed to 
the formula to  decrypt  the submission.   The host  extracts the 
key.
The decrypts the user's key and compares to the key submitted.  
If the two match, login is completed.
4.2 Protocol Steps
1. INITIALIZATION:   The  user  opens  an  account. 
Submits a password; formula parameters and several 
identifiers.
2. The host chooses identifiers for each user.  
3. The  host  independently  chooses  a  unique  secret 
formula to encrypt the user's password.
4. The host  does not  reveal  the host  secret  formula or 
user  identifiers  used  as  seeds  for  non-repeating 
number generation to encrypt the passwords.  .
5. When the user wishes to login, the user requests a time 
date stamp from the host.
6. The host selects one of the user's identifiers.  Encrypts 
the time date stamp with the user's formula and one of 
the user's identifiers.
7. The host temporarily retains this information (the time 
date stamp and user requesting to login in).
8. The host  sends the encrypted time date stamp along 
with  a  token  (a  number)  correlating  to  the  user's 
identifier.
9. The  user  decrypts  the  time  date  stamp  with  the 
identifier and user formula.
10. The  user  encrypts  the  password  with  the  time  date 
stamp, using one of the user's  personal identifiers as 
the seed for the user's formula.
11. The user sends the encrypted password, with a token 
for  the  identifier,  to  the  host.   (This  step  could  be 
modified so that the user does NOT send the token. 
The host  would  have to use all  the  users identifiers 
and try  several decryptions for a match,)
12. The host  uses the user's  formula,  with the time date 
stamp  and  user  identifier  (correlating  to  the  token 
received)  as  the  seed  to  the  formula  to  decrypt  the 
submission.  The host extracts the key.
13. The  host  uses  the  host's  formula  and  proper  user 
identifiers to extract the key from the password file.
14. The host compares the two keys.
15. The host erases the record of the request to login and 
the time date stamp issued.
16. If sufficient time passes without the user responding, 
the host erases the record of the request to login and 
the time data stamp issued.
4.3 Protocol Analysis
This  protocol  requires  the  user  to  have  a  plugin  to  do  the 
calculations and splicing in order to submit a login.
This does not seem to be an issue.  The expense of calculating 
the math should be negligible considering that a password will 
be between 8-20 characters (a standard for modern day systems). 
The sysadmin must be trusted not to reveal the secret formula or 
choice of  identifiers.   But,  this  is  not  a major  concern.   The 
major  concern is  the theft  of the password  file  and sufficient  
time to launch an attack.
This protocol will not prevent keylogging.
Whatever weakness there is in the transmission of the password, 
the password file itself is perfectly secure.  Because the host's  
one  time  pad  encryption  of  the  passwords  is  done  with  a 
separate  non-repeating  sequence  from  the  non-repeating 
sequence used in password transmission.
Using the time date stamp as part of the seed for the formula for 
the non-repeating sequence ensures uniqueness.
Having a copy of the login program and password is not enough 
to spoof the host and login.   One will  have to also know the 
parameters  to  the  formula (which  can be  keylogged)  and  the 
identifiers (which can be keylogged).  However, the identifiers 
are never explicitly transmitted.   They are only referenced by 
token.   This  addresses  the issue of sending passwords  in  the 
clear.  This protocol does not send passwords in the clear.
4.4 The Formalized Protocol
Hf – Host Formula
I1..In – Identifiers 1...n
P – Password
TS – Time Date Stamp
T1...n – Tokens 1...n
Ta – time allotted for acceptable login
Tp – time passed for login procedure
Uf – User formula
Host Side Password Encryption:
1. E(Hf(P,In))
Login Request:
1. User requests login.
2. Host E(Uf(TS,In))
3. Host retains  TS
4. Host E(Uf(TS)),In  → User
5. User D( E(Uf(TS))),In
6. User E(Uf(P,TS,In))
7. User E(Uf(P,TS,In)),In   → Host
8. Host D(E(Uf(P,TS,In)),In)
9. Host D(E(Hf(P,In)))
10. Host compares D(E(Hf(P,In)))==D(E(Uf(P,TS,In))
11. If  comparison  succeeds  and  Tp<=Ta;  then  login  is 
made.
12. Host deletes TS
13. Host deletes login request.
4.5 Other Protocols
This is just one possible protocol.  Many similar conventional 
key exchange protocols could be adapted to use T.E.C.
5. Conclusion
In sum, T.E.C. steganograhpic presents a very strong encryption 
that could certainly be used for small messages, passwords, to 
provide very strong encryption.
Employing T.E.C. steganography for password encryption in a 
password  would  provide  “perfect  security”  and  be 
“cryptanalytically unbreakable”.
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